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“Winter is coming”
(George R. R. Martin, A Game of Thrones)
This article focuses on the relation between constitution and society, namely how the popular perception of
identity and values can impact on constitutional democracy and its institutions, and how the reformulation of
national identities can endanger the European project and constitutional democracy itself.
When national identities are (re)deﬁned along cultural, ethnic or religious characteristics, there seems to be a
“zero-sum game” between the constitutional recognition of these characteristics and liberal values that include
equality and human rights. The dual movement of strengthening cultural, ethnic or religious characteristics and of
weakening liberal values in many countries can be traced back, at least partly, to global phenomena like
economic downturn and restructuring, the advance of the far-right and the crisis of the left, the movement of
formerly extremist ideas into mainstream discourse, the call for authoritarian leaders.i First, all these show
resemblance to the interwar period. And second, because of the interconnectedness of national developments, it
is not enough to look at the Hungarian or the Polish democratic backlash, Brexit or other events like the
authoritarian turn in Turkey or the US presidential elections in isolation: I argue that a crucial factor in
understanding “the zero-sum game” is to unearth the common features, in addition to the national peculiarities.
This article raises the questions whether the emergent authoritarianism in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
region may contain lessons for what is going on in Western Europe.
Transforming National Identities
All constitutional systems require the construction and deﬁnition of a constitutional ‘We’ in the name of whom the
system talks and works. The national/constitutional identities of states are partly determined by the relation to
historical, religious, ethnic identities. Identiﬁcation with a constitution and a constituted community is often too
abstract to attract popular loyalty. Recent developments have shown that many people across Europe prefer
historical, religious, ethnic identities and the shared heritage of the local societies in which they live; and deﬁne
their identity against liberal values.
Some of the reasons of recently changing national identities of member states are rooted partly in global societal
processes, such as economic downturn and restructuring that can result in social conﬂicts, or the return to local
communities and premodern, nationalistic values, which goes against the traditions of the Enlightenment and the
principle of equality. We are witnessing changes in the political system, too: the advance of the far-right and the
crisis of the left. Previously extremist ideas are moving into mainstream discourse, the radical right is gaining
more and more inﬂuence in Europe and racism is on the rise.  It is no accident that some authors have raised the
question whether interwar Europe is comparable with the present situation.ii There are not only diﬀerences (e.g.
alterations in the role of media, and in institutions) but also similarities between the debt crisis of 2009, leading to
an economic downturn and the great Depression of 1929, and the 1930s’ turn into dictatorship and the spread of
antisemitism are comparable with the recent trends of growing racism (anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant, anti-Roma
sentiments) and attacks against democratic institutions.iii
If we will look at the recent authoritarian tendencies in CEE, the goal, in line with the idea of the important
element of interconnected developments, is to go beyond the common explanations that point out the lack of
democratic experience, the weakness of civil society and the public desire for a strong leader. The societal
trends of Member States cannot be examined in isolation: if the processes are interrelated, constants are crucial
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in understanding the interconnectedness. For instance Brexit and the Hungarian crisis have common features:
the fears from losing sovereignty (“taking back control” from the EU), nostalgia for historic grievance (for the
British Empire and for Hungary before Trianon), the idea of a state with a closed border, arguments against
migration and multiculturalism.iv Furthermore, this vision of the national identities in the two cases implies not
merely intolerance but also the need for identifying who is “the other” (the EU, ethnic minorities, migrants,
refugees). Not in the same way but both of the crises are about the self-identiﬁcation of the people and the
separation from others, and the other is typically foreign, belongs to a minority and European. The British case
combines, similar to the Hungarian case, Euroscepticism with human rights scepticism.v Brexit is sometimes
discussed not only as an exit from the EU but also as partly an exit from the ECHR.
Without implying that recently the Hungarian autocratic regime and the UK constitutional democracy are in any
way similar to each other, it has to be seen that societal processes which are behind the Hungarian constitutional
turn or the Polish democratic backlash appeared in other member states too and they shape their national
identities and mean a real danger for old constitutional democracies too. And needless to say, these processes
have an impact outside of the EU. The clearest and most recent example is the presidential election campaign
and the victory of Donald Trump, who used arguments similar to the ones that appeared under the Hungarian
constitutional turn: removing “criminal” and illegal immigrants, building a wall on the southern border, making the
US “great again”. The ﬁrst comment of the Hungarian prime minister after Trump’s Victory was the following:
“Congratulations, this is very good news, the democracy is still alive!”
Furthermore, the vision of national identities in the various cases implies not merely intolerance but also the need
for identifying who “the other” is (the EU, ethnic minorities, migrants, refugees). The process of self-identiﬁcation
involves the separation from others, and the other is typically foreign and belongs to a minority or, for that matter,
Europe. The formulation of national identity of the state follows the logic pointed out by Karl Schmitt: it is partly
based on the diﬀerentiation between we/the nation and they/others (European Union, European/human
rights/migrants/minorities).
A Need for a New Approach
It is hard to say whether the recent clash between values and its consequences (e.g. the democratic backlash in
CEE countries) were foreseeable or not, the conﬂict certainly didn’t come out of the blue. Before the Eastern
enlargement, the EU had a fear of a nationalistic backlash in the new democracies. Although former state-
socialist countries became constitutional democracies and according to the Commission they fulﬁlled the political
criteria of European accession (stability of institutions, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for
and protection of minorities), the EU formed a more benign image of certain new member states than the real
situation would have allowed for, because it focused mainly on their legal systems and expected CEE Member
States to improve within the EU.
Some other recent clashes between Member States national identities and the European Union could have been
foreseen, too, such as the EU’s conﬂicts with the UK and Poland. With protocol No. 30 to the Lisbon Treaty,
Poland and the United Kingdom wanted to step back from the binding provisions of the Charter on Fundamental
Rights. According to the Protocol the Charter does not give national or European Courts any new powers to strike
down or reinterpret UK or Polish law including social law or labour law legislation. The European Parliament
pointed out that Protocol No. 30 ‘is not an ‘opt-out’, it does not amend the Charter and it does not alter the legal
position which would prevail if it were not to exist. Thus, the Parliament and other EU institutions considered the
Protocol as a factor giving rise to legal uncertainty and thereby endangering the rule of law. The ECJ stated in
the NS judgement that Protocol No. 30 “does not call into question the applicability of the Charter in the United
Kingdom or in Poland.” The debates around the Protocol in some degree predicted the recent conﬂicts between
the EU and UK and the EU and Poland.
When analysing the national identity of states, some academic literaturevi focuses on the judicial review of the
member states’ Constitutional Courts and the practice of the Court of Justice, and on the issue of who the ﬁnal
arbiter is. However, this approach is misleading, because it shows us only the tip of the iceberg. Although some
of these cases are very interesting and well researched,vii this approach has a very limited potential to explain
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the current challenges of the EU and of constitutional democracies. One of the problems with the approach is that
it focuses mainly on judicial review and it does not take into account the diﬀerent constitutional structure of states,
for instance the British model which is based on parliamentary supremacy, and where the judicial review has a
lesser role. But what is a more substantial problem is that it presupposes a “convergence between the principles
of domestic constitutional law enjoying speciﬁc protection and the constitutional principles of the EU.”viii That this
might be misleading is proved by the Hungarian case, where the constitution (’Fundamental Law’) in force since
2012 openly rejects European values by listing in its preamble elements necessary to common national identity,
such as belonging to the ethnic nation, belonging to Christianity, ﬁdelity, faith, and love. Nowadays, Hungary
presents the most obvious case where all elements of constitutional democracy protected under Article 2 of the
TEU are threatened: checks and balances, fundamental rights, the rule of law, etc. What is more, the recent
Polish turn of events shows that the Hungarian way might appear a recipe to follow for other East and Central
European Member States and maybe for other member states too.
The often used term “multispeed EU” means not only that some countries move faster in the same direction but
it could also refer to the fact that some member states are moving in the opposite direction. A clear example for
this is the Hungarian constitutional crisis, where according to many authors the democratic institutions (including
the Constitutional Court) are sick or not working any more.ix
In such a situation it is a mistake to focus only on what is the national courts’ or the CJEU’s interpretation of the
protection of the national identities of member states because this standpoint presupposes that all member
states respect the principles of constitutionalism and take part in the same discourse. And it is not enough to
focus on the appearance of national identity in public law and political ethno-nationalism through the lens of
constitutional law, but the analyses should be extended to the social and political causes of transforming national
identities, i.e. the structural causes of the social demand for discourses and values of the nation.
*
Not only new and old constitutional democracies but the EU also found itself in a diﬃcult situation. If the EU does
not apply eﬀective sanctions against Hungary, it will compromise its core values. However, one can also argue
that more eﬀective measures against a Member State will strengthen "exit-minded" Eurosceptics. This might be
the reason why the EU stood by idly and watched the demolition of constitutional democracy in Hungary
passively. The EU’s legitimacy is thin and this weakness is reﬂected in its impotence in the face of the drift
towards authoritarianism in CEEs. It remains to be seen whether such an authoritarian turn as the Hungarian can
happen in old democracies and if their institutions are strong enough to limit the eﬀects of global processes
which are shaping the national identities of societies and the impact of Member States on the shared EU
framework.
As Michael Keating states „There is a real prospect here for an English populist right movement of the sort we
see in other European countries, with their mix of ethnic nationalism, nativism, Europhobia, protectionism and
welfare chauvinism. The extreme right has never been a serious force in British politics but there have been
bursts of support in the 1930s, the 1970s and the 1990s. There is no reason to think that the British are naturally
immune to it.”
This article wants to underline that it is very dangerous for the institutions of constitutional democracy if the
majority of the people does not share the constitutional values. It could mean a real danger for old member
states too, which predicted by Eastern and Central European political turns. Hungary and Poland show that EU
Member States can deﬁne their national identity in ways that breach the values of constitutionalism (e.g. equality,
protection of human rights) yet this deﬁnition is supported by the majorities of people. The question arises
whether the institutions of Western democracies are enough strong to ensure popular loyalty for values of
constitutionalism.
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